Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1975

Geneva Meldrum v. Klarence Meldrum : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard L Maxfield; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Will L Hoyt; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Meldrum v. Meldrum, No. 13684.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/85

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
DEC 9 1975
JNIVERSITY
J Reuben C,ark L a w

INTHCcimr>^
W

rHEST

School

ATEOFUTAH

GENEVA MELDRUM
P,aintif
vs

tRe S pondent
Case No.

KLARENCE MELDRUM
Defendant-Appellant

13684

RESPOIMDENrs BRIEF
Appeal fronvJudgme^TpimT^T^

JuTcoumy t h D l s t n c t C o u r t

Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge

RICHARD L. MAXFIELD
28 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
WILL L. HOYT
31 South Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

F

a

m

a

ILED

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
POINT I! APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF
FACTS IGNORES THE REAL BASIS FOR THE
LAWSUIT, AND THE BASIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION, TO-WIT: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
1964 CONTRACT

1

POINT II. APPELLANT IN POINTS I AND II
OF HIS ARGUMENT AGAIN IGNORES PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AND HIS OWN COUNTER-CLAIM WHICH REQUEST AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1964 CONTRACT ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES

7

POINT III. THE OFFERING OF A PRE-TRIAL
SETTLEMENT OF A CLAIM IS NOT ADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE

8

POINT IV! THE REVIEWING COURT SHOULD
RESPECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS UNLESS THERE IS A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY

10

POINT V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT JUDGMENT FOR INTEREST AND FOR HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES

12

POINT VI. WHEN THE MATTER IS AT ISSUE
AND SET FOR TRIAL, AND THE PLAINTIFF AT
THE TRIAL, PRESENTS HIS EVIDENCE, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE READY TO PRESENT HIS
EVIDENCE, AND A REQUEST FOR A CONTINU-

(i)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ANCE OF SEVERAL DAYS OR WEEKS TO ALLOW
DEFENDANT TO SECURE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
WAS PROPERLY DENIED
CONCLUSION

13
14

CASES CITED
State Highway Commission V. Arms, 518 P. 2d 35,
(1974)

9

People v. Southern Pacific Trans. Corp., 109 Cal Rptr
525 525, (1973) Califor:
Vorkmelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N. W. 2d 287, (Mich.
App. 1972) Michigan
Dutch Hill Inc. vs. Patten, 303 A.2d 811 (9173)
Vermont
Nance v. City of Provo, 29 Utah 2d 340, 509 P.2d 365,
(1973)
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2dl, 455 P. 2d
197,(1969)
Bramel v. State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 465
P. 2d 532, (1970)
Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526,
(1973)
Nyman v. Cedar City, 13 Utah 2d 45, 361 P. 2d 1114,
(1961)
Wagner V. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 370, 482 P2d 702,
(1971)

9
9
10
10
11
11
11
11
12

(ii)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENEVA MELDRUM
Plaintiff-Respondent
_ vs .
KLARENCE MELDRUM
Defendant-Appellant

\
f
\
(
/

Case No.
13684

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
POINT I
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IGNORES THE
REAL BASIS FOR THE LAWSUIT, AND THE BASIS OF
THE COURT'S DECISION, TO-WIT: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1964 CONTRACT.
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The Appellant, in his statement of facts, ignores the real
issue of the Lawsuit and the basis of the Court's decision, as
he attempted to do throughout the trial of this matter.
On April 1, 1964, the Plaintiff, as seller, entered into a
wirtten contract of sale with the Defendant for the purpose
of selling her one-half interest in cattle, farm machinery, and
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a ranch in Juab County. A copy of the 1964 contract between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant is attached to the Plaintiff's
Complaint. (R.6) The contract price was $40,000.00, and
inasmuch as the sale was made from mother to son, no
interest was to be charged on the agreement. However, on
page 5 of the written agreement paragraph 5. C. c. read as
follows:
c. That in the event that buyer sells his interest in
the above described property or assigns this contract
during the lifetime of the seller for a sum in excess of
the purchase price herein., Forty Thousand Dollars
($40,000.00), that in such event he will pay one-half
of the excess thereof over $40,000.00 to the seller
herein, from the first three payments under such sale.
(R.ll)
On or about November 1, 1968, the Plaintiff and the
Defendant joined with James R. Meldrum in executing a
Uniform Real Estate Contract to sell the ranch property to
Lowell H. Rasmussen and Barbara Fraser Rasmussen, husband
and wife, for a total purchase price of $158,000.00.
$79,000.00 was for the real property sold by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant under the 1964 Contract. A copy of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract was attached to Plaintiff's
Complaint and referred to as the Rasmussen Contract. (R. 12)
Some time after the Rasmussen contract had been
entered into by the parties, a question arose concerning the
interpretation of paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract as
quoted hereinabove. Plaintiff understood the paragraph to
mean that she would receive an additional $19,500.00,
(1/2 of the excess over $40,000.00) from the first three
payments received on the Rasmussen contract, the Defendant took the view that a sale had not been made until such
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time as he had been paid in full on the Rasmussen contract,
at which time he would then pay to the Plaintiff the
$19,500.00 to which she was entitled under said paragraph.
Defendant took the further view that even if the Rasmussen
contract were paid in full, and the property deeded to the
Buyers, that he would be under no obligation to pay to the
Plaintiff the full balance due and owing on the 1964 contract, but could continue to make the yearly payments of
$2,500.00, without interest, until the total purchase price
of $40,000.00 had been paid.
Attempts were made to resolve this dispute, all without
success.
In January of 1971, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint, and
in the First Cause of Action asked the Court to interpret the
1964 contract, the Rasmussen contract, and to determine the
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's respective rights thereunder.
(R.5) The Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action asked the Court
to determine that the execution of the Rasmussen contract
constituted a form of novation as to the 1964 contract, and
that the Plaintiff should receive 65.81 percent of the funds
received by the parties on the Rasmussen contract.
Defendant filed an Answer and a Counter-claim (R.25).
In answer to the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action, the
Defendant stated as follows:
. . . defendant admits and alleges that it is expedient
and desirable that the court interpret and declare the
true meaning of the contracts referred to as Exhibt
"A" and in Exhibit " B " and direct Walker Bank &
Trust Company as escrow holder to disburse funds
3
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received for credit of Plaintiff and Defendant herein
in accordance with the true intent and meaning of
said contracts, Exhibit "A" and Exhibit " B " .
The Defendant generally denied the allegations contained
in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. As a Counter-claim
the Defendant alleged that certain payments had been made
on the 1964 contract for which he was entitled to credit, and
in his prayer asked:
3. That the court interpret and declare the effect of
said contracts, Exhibit "A" and Exhibit " B " in the
light of facts and circumstances hereinabove set
forth . . .
The Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's Counter-claim,
(R.37) asking the Court to examine the 1964 contract and
the Rasmussen contract, and admitting:
. . . that a disagreement has developed between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant as to the distribution of
monies to be received under the Rasmussen contract,
and that when the Defendant attempted to have the
Walker Bank disburse funds to him alone the bank
was instructed to follow the original Escrow and
Agreement, and did so by disbursing funds at a latter
date to the Plaintiff and Defendant as per their written
authorization,
and otherwise generally dening the allegations of the Defendant's Counter-claim.
The parties engaged in some discovery and a pre-trial
hearing was brought by the Court on April 3,1972, at Nephi,
Utah. At the pre-trial the Defendant argued that the
Rasmussen contract did not amount to a sale, and that he was
not required to divide any excess over $40,000.00, (the
1964 contract purchase price) until the Defendant himself
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had received some excess over $40,000.00 on the sale of the
property. This matter was argued to the Court and later a
memorandum was submitted by the parties for the Court's
consideration. At the Court's request, Counsel for Plaintiff
prepared a pre-trial order, but the same was not signed
because of Defendant's objections.
The matter was set for trial before the Court on June
26, 1972, at Nephi, Utah. The Plaintiff was present and
represented by her counsel. She had witnesses ready to
testify and James R. Meldrum was sworn and testified in
behalf of the Plaintiff. After James R. Meldrum had testified,
the Defendant requested additional time to introduce evidence in opposition to the testimony of James R. Meldrum.
The request for an extention of time was granted to the
Defendant by the Court. In order to expedite the hearing of
the matter, the Plaintiff stipulated that the testimony of
James R. Meldrum could be striken, and that the Plaintiff
would stipulate as to the value of the lifestock and machinery
which the Defendant had sold, and which were not included
in the Rasmussen contract, but which were included in the
1964 contract. (R.52)

On March 7, 1973, the Court filed a Memorandum
Decision (R. 87) in which is was determined that the 1964
contract was not modified, amended or novated by the
Rasmussen contract as alleged in Plaintiff's Second Cause
of Action. Plaintiff's First Cuase of Action, (the interpretation of the 1964 contract,) was the only question to be
decided by the Court.
5
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Although the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action had
not been acted upon, the Defendant submitted to the Court
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. These indicated payments made by defendant to the
Plaintiff in sums greater than had previously been alleged in
Plaintiff's or Defendant's pleadings, or Answers to Interrogatories, or any evidence before the Court; and in addition
thereof awarded Judgment to the defendant for interest
at the legal rate on the amount of funds to which
the Defendant is found to be entitled from the date
when said funds were received by said escrow agent,
to-wit, August 18, 1972.
and a reasonable attorney's fee for Defendant's attorney.
Said Conclusions of Law and Judgment provided that the
Defendant was to receive a sum certain from the Escrow
agent with interest thereon. The balance, if any, should be
paid to the Plaintiff. The matter of the interpretation of the
1964 contractus requested in Plaintiff's First Cause of Action
and the Defendant's Counter-claim, was not considered in the
proposed Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (Court
Exhibit "A").
The matter was before the Court on April 10, 1973, in
regards to the several motions that had been filed, the Defendant's proposed Findings, and Plaintiff's objections thereto.
The matter was taken under advisement. While the matter
was under advisement, the Defendant submitted revised
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, Demands for Answers to Interrogatories, Motion
to Rule upon Legal Issues and several other documents.
6
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Finally on November 13, 1973, the case came on for further
hearing. Plaintiff's exhibits P-l, P-2, P-3 and P-4 were offered
by Plaintiff, not objected to by the Defendant, and received
by the Court. Defendant's exhibits D-l, D-2, D-3, D-4 and
D-5 were offered by the Defendent but were objected to by
the Plaintiff and the objection was sustained. The Court
then directed Counsel for the Plaintiff to submit revised
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and
allowed the Defendant ten days after receipt of same to
file objections. The Plaintiff submitted revised Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment (R.159-168), and the Defendant
filed objections thereto. (R.182).
On December 11, 1973, the case came on before the
Court on the pending motions and objections (R.156, Tr.
B-l) and for trial to follow the criminal calender. The
parties each offered testimony and other evidence in behalf
of their respective claims. The Court took the case under
advisement and later signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment which interpreted the 1964 contract,
as requested by the parties. These were filed with the Clerk
of the Court on March 4,1974. Defendant then filed a motion
for new trial which was overruled. He later filed this appeal.

POINT II
APPELLANT IN POINTS I AND II OF HIS ARGUMENT AGAIN IGNORES PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION AND HIS OWN COUNTER-CLAIM WHICH RE-
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QUEST AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1964 CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The Defendant in his Point I sets out several payments
that he alleges to have been made to the Plaintiff by the Defendant and other payments made by the Defendant on
other mortgages for which he is to receive credit, for the
purpose of showing that the Defendant was not in default
on the contract at the time of the commencement of this
action. The Court made no finding that the Defendant was in
fact in default on the contract at the time of the commencement of the action, and did not need to do so. The parties
had requested an interpretation of the 1964 contract and
specifically paragraph 5. C. c.
The Defendant then goes on further to state in his First
Point that he had offered to settle the dispute many times
with the Plaintiff in accordance with his interpretation of the
1964 contract. He completely ignored the fact that the question before the Court was the interpretation of the 1964 contract. The Plaintiff requested the Court to determine in
accordance with Paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract,
after the Defendant had sold his interest in the real property
to Rasmussen, when, and how much money the Defendant
was to pay to the Plaintiff.

POINT III
THE OFFERING OF A PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT
OF A CLAIM IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
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The Defendant in Point III of his argument contends
that the Court erred in rejecting letters that Defendant's
Counsel had written to Plaintiff's Counsel setting out offers
of compromise.

The general rule is that evidence of offerings to settle
out of court is not admissible in an action between the
parties. The philosophy underlying this feeling stems from
the attempt of the courts to foster out of court settlements.
The settlement would not be accomplished if the parties
thought their negotiations would be admissible in court to
impute liability or guilt. No Utah decisions have addressed
this subject, but other jurisdictions have strongly embraced
the rule.

Offers made in an effort to compromise an action are
not admissible against the party in any court action.
— State Highway Commission V. Arms, 518 P. 2d 35,
(1974). Montana

Offers in effort to settle eminent domain proceedings
are inadmissible for evidence at trial on eminent domain proceedings. — People v. Southern Pacific Trans.
Corp., 109 Cal Rptr 525, (1973) Califor:

Offers to settle between parties to a lawsuit are not
admissible. — Vorkmelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N. W.
2d 287, (Mich. App. 1972) Michigan
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Public policy favoring settlement of disputed claims
without litigation prohibits admission of evidence of
unaccepted offers of settlement. — Dutch Hill Inc. vs.
Patten, 303 A.2d 811 (1973) Vermont.
POINT IV
THE REVIEWING COURT SHOULD RESPECT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS UNLESS THERE IS A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
The appellant in his argument under Points IV and
V of his brief claims that the Court erred in not making
certain Findings, and in its interpretation of the contract.
At no time during the course of this case did the Defendant
offer any evidence of the payments made on the contract,
but tried to have the Court accept said evidence based
on his proposed Findings. The Plaintiff stipulated to all
items included in the Court's Findings. The Court was
then left with the job of interpreting the 1964 contract,
based upon the document itself, and the evidence as stipulated
to by the parties.
The rule of law is well established in Utah, that the
reviewing Court will not overturn the trial Court's Findings
and Judgment unless there is a preponderance of evidence
that will not support the Findings and Judgment.
Members of the appellant court do not have the
opportunity to hear the witnesses and see their demeanor in court and on the witness stand and are not
in as good of position to weigh the evidence as is the
trial judge or jury. It is our duty on appeal to affirm
the trial court in its findings of fact where there is
competant evidence to affirm those findings. — Nance
v. City of Provo, 29 Utah 2d 340, 509 P.2d 365,
(1973).
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Inasmuch as there is substantial, reasonable, and
credible evidence to support his finding, it is not our
prerogative to upset it. — Keller v. Deseret Mortuary
Co., 23 Utah 2dl, 455 P.2d 197, (1969).
The foundational rule of this aspect of the procedure
is that it is the trial judge's prerogative to find the
facts; . . . it is therefore more accurate to say that on
review we survey the evidence in the light favorable
to the findings, whichever party they may favor, and
they are supported by substantial evidence. —Bramel
v. State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P. 2d
534, (1970)
Branch v. Western Factors Inc., 28 Utah 2d 361,
502 P.2d 570 (1972).
Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P. 2d
526, (1973).
Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P. 2d
1114, (1961).
Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621,
(1953).
The Court was asked to interpret paragraph 5. C. c.
of the 1964 contract which read as follows:
That in the event that buyer sells his interest in the
above described property or assigns this contract
during the lifetime of the seller for a sum in excess
of the purchase price herein, Forty Thousand Dollars
($40,000.00), that in such event he will pay one-half
of the excess thereof over $40,000.00 to the seller
herein, from the first three payments under such sale.
The Court interrupted the foregoing paragraph of the 1964
contract to mean that the Plaintiff was entitled to all
benefits that such sale might bring about, including principal
and interest. The Court than made a Finding to the effect that
the increase in the sale price of the real and personal
property was $38,050.00, of which the Plaintiff was entitled
11
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to one-half as per terms of the 1964 contract, being the sum
of $19,025.00, plus interest; which Finding should stand.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT JUDGMENT FOR INTEREST AND FOR HIS
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The appellant in his Point VI claims that the Court
erred in denying him Judgment for interest and attorney's
fees.
What the Defendant fails to recognize is that the Court
did not accept his interpretation of the 1964 contract, and
specifically found the 1964 contract to mean that the Plaintiff was entitled to all benefits that such sale (Rasmussen
sale) might bring about including principal and interest. The
Court's logical interpretation of the 1964 contract amounted
to a finding for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
Specifically against the Defendant's illogical interpretation
of paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract.
Inasmuch as the Court found against the Defendant, then
it must of necessity not award the Defendant his costs and
attorney's fee. Further the Court did not err in not granting
the Defendant Judgment for interest where the case was
found against him, and the fact that he had not requested
same in any of his pleadings.
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put to
issue at the trial cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal. —Wagner V. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366,
370, 482 P2d 702, (1971).
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POINT VI
WHEN THE MATTER IS AT ISSUE AND SET FOR
TRIAL, AND THE PLAINTIFF AT THE TRIAL, PRESENTS
HIS EVIDENCE, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE READY
TO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE, AND A REQUEST FOR A
CONTINUANCE OF SEVERAL DAYS OR WEEKS TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO SECURE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
After a condiserable period of time, and several hearings
on Motions and Objections to proposed Findings of Fact, etc.,
the Court set the case for trial to follow the criminal calendar. Plaintiff was present with witnesses and offered testimony
at the trial of the case that day. The defendant did not
testify, but his counsel attempted to offer in evidence two
letters which he claimed to have received from the escrow
agent. When counsel for the Plaintiff objected to the introduction of these two letters, counsel for the Defendant was
then sworn and testified concerning offers of settlement and
the receipt of the two letters, which again the Court rejected,
upon the objection of Plaintiff's Counsel. This evidence,
which the Defendant proposed to offer, was completely new
to the Plaintiff, having never been brought out in any of the
pleadings or interrogatories previously filed. Upon the Court's
refusal to allow the introduction of said letters, counsel for
the Defendant requested a continuance for the purpose of
making arrangments to bring the escrow agent before the
Court at a later date. It was in the late afternoon when this
request was made, the escrow agent was in Provo, and the
13
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case was being tried in Nephi. It would have been impossible
to of had the witness brought before the Court that day,
Particularly since the Defendant had never contacted the
witness and advised him of the trial.
This matter had been pending for many months. The
Defendant was advised of the trial date and should have been
prepared with his witnesses to present the evidence that he
desired at the trial. The evidence that he offered covered only
a minor matter concerning a small payment claimed to have
been made to the Plaintiff for the benefit of the Defendant.
The proffered evidence had no bearing whatsoever on the
major issue of the case, the interpretation of paragraph 5.
C. c. of the 1964 contract. At the first trial the case was continued at Defendant's request because he did not have
witnesses or other evidence ready to present to the Court
on that date. To again grant the Defendant a continuance of
the trial for such a minor matter would have been improper,
and a basis for Plaintiff to have claimed substantial error.
The Court's denying Defendant's Motion for a continuance
to permit Defendant to produce evidence of payments made
by the Escrow agent for which the Defendant claimed he was
entitled to credit, was entirely proper.
CONCLUSION
The brief of the appellant is a repetitious rehash of
Defendant's arguments before the Trial Court. Defendant's
counsel would not accept the fact that others, including
Plaintiff's counsel and the Court, might interpret paragraph
5. C. c. of the 1964 contract different from what he did.
Therefore, throughout all the hearings and trial of the case, he
14
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attempted only to show the offers of settlement he had
made in accordance with his interpretation of the contract,
without at any time arguing the interpretation of the contract
before the Court, or asking the Court to so accept his interpretation.
The appellant in his reply brief has done the same thing.
He has not at any time indicated that the Court erred in its
interpretation of paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract.
Rather, he has assumed that everyone accepted his interpretation of the contract (without stating what his interpretation of the paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract was), and
then based on his interpretation of the contract has cited
points wherein he believes the Court was in error. None of
these points would be in error if the Court's interpretation of
the 1964 contract was accepted.
The trial judge execised great patience and understanding in trying this case, and should be commended therefor.
His decision should stand, and the Plaintiff should have her
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending this action.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard L. Maxfield,
Attorney for Plaintiff
(Respondent)

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

